



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 27, 1968

SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

Chairman's Summary
of Discussion and Decisions
at the
38th SIG Meeting on May 23, 1968

Present:

Under Secretary of State, Chairman
Mr. Earle for the Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Johnson for the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Poats for the Administrator, Agency for
International Development
Director, United States Information Agency
Special Assistant to the President
Under Secretary of Treasury
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
SIG Staff Director

JCS - General Orwat
DOD - Dr. Halperin
State - Mr. Farley
Mr. Furnas
Mr. Lesh

I. Proposed Revision of United States Policy on
Foreign Internal Defense

The Chairman noted that the SIG has long been concerned with the field of counter-insurgency, and recalled the commissioning in December 1967 of a review of our policy under the auspices of the Political-Military Group (PMG). He expressed his thanks to all those who had participated in the Working Group headed

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and on the Country Director/IRG/SIG mechanism in Washington. As an adjunct to this organization, the new policy included the recommendation that the PMG act as a monitor of foreign internal defense plans and programs on behalf of the SIG. This addition, Mr. Farley explained, hopefully would provide an independent review of implementation of the new policy by the IRGs, and a critical look at new plans and programs by a group apart from those with any direct responsibility for the programs in question.

In conclusion, Mr. Farley commented that the chief follow-up actions would be a review of the National Interdepartmental Seminar (NIS) and related training programs by the Committee on Training, and the re-definition, where required, of roles and missions in accord with the new policy, mainly by the military. Both reports eventually would come to the SIG for approval. Mr. Farley added that he envisaged something in the nature of a permanent sub-group of the PMG, perhaps headed by Mr. Furnas, to deal with foreign internal defense matters. Hopefully, over time this group would develop a reservoir of experience which would be of assistance to the IRGs.

The Chairman stated that he felt the new policy represented a positive contribution. The old Special Group (CI) had been immensely effective in focusing attention within the US Government on what in 1962 was a rather new concept, but the representation on the Special Group had proved to be at too high a level to maintain effective support over the longer term. This paper now appeared to place responsibility at the most effective level in the governmental structure. He believed the imposition of stricter criteria for assistance was a good idea, and that the IRGs would be in the best position to appraise country situations. The Chairman added that he hoped each Assistant Secretary would consider carefully the experience in ARA with the COIN sub-group of the IRG, which had been very successful in bringing to bear needed expertise on operational country problems.

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The Chairman then remarked that he hoped that in the implementation of the new policy Assistant Secretaries and their IRGs would demand a more coherent assessment of the progress of field programs by Ambassadors and Country Teams. Too often at present field recommendations appeared to reflect three or four essentially separate views of a given situation, which had been "glued together" for submission to Washington.

He also was pleased, the Chairman said, with the designation of the PMG to supply critical appraisal and assist the SIG. He anticipated that the PMG, as an essentially disinterested group, could act as a gadfly in the administration of internal defense policy.

There were several lessons, the Chairman went on, which had been incorporated in the new policy. One was that internal defense programs had to be very narrowly tailored to suit specific country situations, as the cases of Guatemala and Thailand, recently before the SIG, certainly proved. Another important lesson was that it was fruitless for the United States to expend its resources in any country where the local government was not committed to the same development goals as we. Without clear recognition by the local government of the need for economic and social progress, we would accomplish little or nothing by attempting to strengthen internal security alone.

Mr. Helms agreed that the new policy statement was an improvement over the 1962 USOIDP, and stated that he felt the PMG would be in a more advantageous position to monitor foreign internal defense matters than the Special Group (CI). He added that he considered this revision a distinct step forward.

General Johnson concurred that the new paper represented a positive contribution, but said he would like to propose two possible revisions. First, on the basis of his experience in the JCS, he felt that the

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question of establishing priorities would be of key importance. In effect all the IRGs would be competing for scarce resources and personnel in proposing foreign internal defense programs, and, in his opinion, the task of establishing priorities would prove to be one of the primary functions to be performed by the PMG. Therefore General Johnson recommended that this concept be given primacy in the outline of the duties of the PMG in the SIG directive. There were several expressions of support for this proposal, and the Chairman agreed to include the suggested revision when the implementing directive is issued.

Second, General Johnson proposed that the outline of a foreign internal defense plan include -- perhaps as a separate annex -- greater emphasis on sociological analysis of the internal structure of a country. He cited Vietnam as an example of a country in which United States efforts had been hindered by our failure to come to grips with the sociological structure of the nation in the development of our programs.

Mr. Walt Rostow recalled that this need had also been felt at the time of the founding of the Special Group (CI), and that a series of such studies had been undertaken then by INR; some eventually had been woven into NPPs on the countries in question. Mr. Rostow also commented that he had found some of the best expertise for this type of sociological analysis among CIA personnel in the field of operations, where such information was invaluable to getting the job done.

Mr. Helms seconded Mr. Rostow's view, noting that the need for sociological analysis in depth unfortunately was difficult to sell within the United States Government, except when there was some clear operational link. He mentioned the crash programs to study the role of Buddhism in Vietnam which had been inspired by the need to find the answer of how to cope with the demonstrative weapon of self-immolation.

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Mr. Marks remarked that USIA had been trying without success for some time to obtain additional funds from Congress for precisely this type of sociological/cultural research on priority target countries. In practice, Mr. Marks said, his agency often had to rely on the research projects approved in the JCS or CIA budgets. However, he added, Senator Fulbright had just succeeded in cutting appropriations for sociological projects in the Defense budget, and had issued a warning not to seek more funds in that area.

The Chairman commented that, tactically at least, he thought there would be far greater acceptance of such research if the projects were posed in purely operational terms, such as testing a specific program proposal, for example, against traditional attitudes or practices within a given country. He would agree with General Johnson that sociological analysis should be given particular weight in the field of foreign internal defense. We must strive to avoid the pitfall of imposing a strictly United States viewpoint on any country or region. To some degree, he felt, this was a weakness of the Martin Study on Latin America, which sometimes appeared to project United States values, likes, and dislikes on the people of Latin America.

Mr. Walt Rostow remarked that he felt Congressional opposition to sociological studies could be partially overcome, and the final product improved, by being very selective in commissioning such studies and exhausting all resources within the United States Government before turning to private research facilities. Mr. Rostow stated that the Country Teams in overseas mission should make the first contribution; then all concerned government agencies should be canvassed, and only after those resources had been tapped should we consult established academic experts. Furthermore, Mr. Rostow said, such projects should begin with only 4-5 target countries, rather than taking a shotgun approach covering 50 or 100 countries.

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Messrs. Helms and Marks spoke in favor of General Johnson's proposal, and the latter explained that he would anticipate a special annex might be prepared by the Country Team as supporting material for an internal defense plan, specifically exploring the effect of sociological/cultural/religious factors on program proposals. The Chairman agreed.

Mr. Rostow went on to comment that he foresaw one possible problem in the administration of foreign internal defense policy under the proposed revision. It was his impression, he continued, that the greatest successes achieved under the old Special Group (CI) were on two widely separated planes: either at the top political level, in supporting -- or in some cases, removing support for -- a given leader or regime, or at the low level of meeting critical hardware requirements -- the realm of "cops and choppers." He hoped that adoption of the revised policy, which stressed the complex of economic/political/social/psychological factors as a guide to action, would not cause us to lose sight of the key importance of the top political leadership in a country, or the relative effectiveness of a small but timely input of rifles, helicopters, or communications equipment to deal with an insurgency situation.

Mr. Marks observed that Mr. Rostow's apprehensions, if carried to their logical conclusion, would constitute a really basic criticism of the new policy. In effect, Mr. Rostow was questioning whether the bureaucratic mechanism as revised could cope successfully with the counterinsurgency job.

In the ensuing discussion Mr. Poats observed that, despite the acknowledged successes of the Special Group (CI), the concept of getting the highest policy level in the United States Government to focus on the smallest details of counterinsurgency had not proved to be viable over the longer term. General Johnson remarked that the problems Mr. Rostow had posed could

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be addressed later, at the time when missions began to submit internal defense plans. For the present, General Johnson said, he felt that the general policy line of the revision was valid; its implementation would be the test.

Mr. Marks referred to the proposed study of the NIS and associated training programs, and underlined the importance of this aspect of the problem. He said the question was not only what we ought to be teaching, but are we training the right people? The Chairman agreed that training was a problem of first importance. Although there had been an attempt to send ambassadors assigned to key countries to the NIS before departure for their posts, there had been difficulty in communicating the sense of the importance of the seminar. The Chairman commented that the NIS had not been working as well as he had hoped, although that was no reflection on those administering the course. One suggestion had been that the NIS was too long. The central issue, Mr. Helms and General Johnson commented, was to ensure the attendance of the right people to make the seminar a success. All agreed that they would look forward to the report of the Committee on Training with interest and concern.

With the understanding that the two revisions proposed by General Johnson and the rest of the SIG discussion would be taken into account in the implementing directive, the revised United States Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries was approved to supersede the 1962 USOIDP.

II. Planning in Anticipation of Foreign Crises

The Chairman requested Mr. Farley to open the discussion of the paper.

Mr. Farley briefly described the background of the Contingency Coordinating Committee (CCC) founded in 1964, and noted the limitations on the scope of its planning and the difficulties it had faced. The paper before the SIG, Mr. Farley pointed out, would have the effect of abolishing the CCC and placing

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responsibility for contingency planning directly on the Assistant Secretary of State and the IRG in each geographic bureau. Furthermore, the mandate for planning would be broadened to include economic and political crises even if there were no anticipated involvement of United States military forces. The second portion of the paper, Mr. Farley concluded, was designed as a guide for more efficient organization in time of crisis.

The Chairman explained that he personally felt strongly that such contingency studies were valuable in bridging the management gap that sometimes is felt in the first hours of an emergency. During the recent tension over troop movements along the borders of Czechoslovakia, the Chairman said, he had been very pleased to be able to refer the White House to the comprehensive study of possible Soviet military or economic pressures in Eastern Europe, which had been circulated to all SIG members. The Chairman remarked that such planning must be done in advance; there was no time to begin writing contingency papers once a crisis had broken. He realized that such studies were not popular, since most of the contingencies for which we were obliged to plan would never occur. But there was no question in his mind of the great value of having a study in hand for that one crisis in a hundred that inevitably would occur.

General Johnson remarked that his military experience had led him to the conclusion that planning of this kind was a great help in orienting oneself to meet a real crisis. Mr. Farley added that the writing of a contingency study also served a training function, which would be useful for country directors, desk officers, and others who might be newly assigned to their positions.

Mr. Walt Rostow warned against the danger of becoming so committed to the detailed terms of a contingency plan that one lost flexibility in dealing with the unpredictable development of a crisis. The Chairman remarked that, regardless of whether a crisis were precisely the one for which planning had been done, the process of contingency planning would have

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created the important inter-agency contacts, set the stage for greater teamwork, and established a framework of detailed information on the country in question which would be of immediate use in any crisis.


Mr. Farley mentioned that he thought he was not alone in observing that the monitoring role assigned to the PMG in the foreign internal defense paper might effectively be repeated in the field of contingency planning, especially when dealing with any plan anticipating possible use of United States military forces. General Johnson supported this suggestion, noting that only slight re-drafting would be required. The Chairman and several other members expressed their approval of a revision to make uniform the role of the PMG in the two papers in question.

The Chairman commented that a study of a purely economic crisis might have international implications so broad that it would be difficult for the regular membership of the IRGs and the PMG to deal with it. He and Mr. Barr agreed that such studies might be referred to special groups which would include all financial agencies concerned.

Mr. Eugene Rostow proposed that the directive implementing the contingency planning and crisis management paper refer specifically to the requirement for attention to public relations, Allied consultation, and Congressional liaison. Mr. Poats commented that he hoped some means would be found to include the often very imaginative views of the intelligence community in IRG contingency studies, and to take advantage of the contribution to be made by those with primarily economic expertise as well.

With the understanding that the SIG directive would take into account the views of the several members expressed in this meeting, the paper on Planning in Anticipation of Foreign Crises was approved.

III. Summary of Discussion of Agenda Item 3 Distributed Separately


Arthur A. Hartman
Staff Director

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UNITED STATES POLICY ON INTERNAL DEFENSE IN SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES



Approved by the Senior Interdepartmental Group

May 23, 1968

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United States Policy
on
Internal Defense
in Selected Foreign Countries

I. PURPOSE AND AUTHORITIES

This policy (short title "Foreign Internal Defense Policy") supersedes "United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy (USOIDP)" issued under cover of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 182 of August 24, 1962. It is consistent with NSAMs 182, 119, 124, 162, 173, 177, 283, and 341. Its provisions govern the foreign internal defense policies, plans, programs, and operations of all U.S. government Departments and Agencies concerned. The appropriate Departments and Agencies should update statements of their roles and missions in support of this policy to replace those set forth in the superseded 1962 policy paper. The new statements should be submitted to the Senior Interdepartmental Group for approval. Departments and Agencies should also issue implementing directives as necessary.

II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Problem

Internal security situations in certain developing countries are a matter of concern for the United States. Because of location or economic resources, the need for U.S. military or other facilities and operating rights (such as transit rights), political alignments, or for other reasons, the United States must pay special attention to these countries and to the ability of their governments to maintain internal order. In certain circumstances, the United States may have to provide governments with assistance for internal defense purposes in order to help protect United States local and strategic interests which might be threatened by internal disorder or subversion. Subversion involves systematic efforts from internal or external

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sources to undermine or overthrow the established political and social order. Internal defense consists of the full range of action programs to maintain internal security, including, in addition to political and diplomatic activity and economic and military assistance, such specialized programs as civil police, psychological, paramilitary, and counter-insurgency operations; counter guerrilla activity, unconventional warfare, military civic actions, and public works.

In some developing countries, independence from significant influence or control by a foreign power may be a major U.S. security objective for political, military, or economic reasons. Such control or influence could result from communist subversion or from communist exploitation of local failure to maintain adequate internal security.

The United States must, therefore, be constantly alert to conditions of internal security in developing countries in order to identify situations where subversion, insurgency, or disorder endanger significant U.S. interests. In these cases, the United States must be prepared to assist governments in appropriate internal defense programs.

B. The U.S. Position

It is a part of our overall foreign policy that ultimately nations be able to develop according to their own traditions and that each be governed in accordance with the will of the majority of its citizens. We believe that governments should respond adequately to the aspirations of the people for political, economic, and social conditions appropriate to their environment, and should move toward the establishment of institutions which will provide some guarantees for the continuation of these conditions as governments change. The development of institutions responsive to local national patterns of behavior is more important, however, than progress toward an objective goal of representative democratic institutions as the United States has traditionally viewed them. In many cases, it is primarily the economic and technical aspects of modernization which are attractive goals in developing countries, and there is often great resistance to changes in political and social systems, no matter how important or appropriate these changes may seem to us.

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The process of modernization in developing countries is often destabilizing in itself, and changes in political and social systems often are accomplished by revolutionary activity. While the United States would usually prefer basic changes in a society to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, the growth process is generally accompanied by unrest, upheaval, and violence. In U.S. policies toward foreign internal security situations, it is important to make a distinction between disorder and insurgency which may be a function of national growth and that which is a result of subversion.

Thus, the position which the United States should take with respect to the internal security situation in a foreign country is an integral, inseparable part of the overall U.S. policy toward the country and the region in which it is located. It cannot be formulated in isolation from other aspects of U.S. policy nor implemented as a separate program. The policy problem is to make judgments about the nature and speed of the process of national development and, where U.S. interests require it, to find ways to influence the process constructively.

The United States does not regard every situation of political instability or social disorder and violence as a foreign internal security problem threatening U.S. interests and requiring U.S. assistance for internal defense programs. In some cases, the forces making for instability and political upheaval may contribute, in the long run, to the achievement of objectives deserving of encouragement and support from the United States. In any case, it does not seem possible entirely to deprive people of the use of force for purposes of social change, and action which is too repressive may worsen the problem by forcing the pressures for alterations in institutions outside legal or acceptable channels and into subversive forms.

In countries where significant U.S. interests are not threatened by internal disorder or subversion, the United States should seek to avoid becoming involved in internal defense policies, plans, and operations of local governments. Even in these cases, however, it may be in the U.S. interest to provide internal defense equipment or training assistance appropriate to the situation and to U.S. objectives in the countries concerned.

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Internal defense policy and programs for countries the United States may be prepared to assist will need to be determined on a case-by-case basis and carefully tailored to the specific and unique aspects of each situation. Important considerations which will affect the determination of the kind and nature of U.S. internal defense policy and programs for particular countries are: first, U.S. interests in the area; then the sources, kinds, and degree of threat to internal security; dangers from external exploitation; the possibility of local conflict broadening into larger-scale wars; the consequences of the internal security problem for overall development within the country; the will and ability of the local government to handle the situation with indigenous resources; the effect of U.S. programs on other programs within the country; the consequences of U.S. policies and programs on the U.S. position in other countries; the availability of external assistance from other nations or international organizations.

One of our primary concerns is to anticipate situations requiring U.S. foreign internal defense action far enough in advance, and to devise, in cooperation with local governments, effective programs which will make unnecessary the engagement of U.S. combat troops. The long-term implications of use of U.S. military forces should be carefully studied in any consideration of such a step.

C. The Importance of Local Efforts

The process of change within a country is largely stimulated by local initiative, guided by national leaders, reliant on indigenous resources, and ultimately bears a national trademark. The role of internal defense is to permit the changes to take place in as orderly a manner as possible and without outside interference. The kind and amount of police and military action required to maintain internal security for each country are most likely also to be determined according to the character of the government and the people and the requirements for such force as seen by them. It is clear that the United States should persuade the countries concerned to do as much as they can for their own internal defense. We should realize, however, that many resource-poor countries are unable to attain their goals for political and economic modernization or their objectives of improved conditions of law and order

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without external help. Where U.S. interests warrant it and U.S. resources can be made available, the United States can provide such assistance or, in combination with other nations which share our common goals, see that it is provided.

D. U.S. Actions

The nature of the U.S. response toward foreign internal security situations may be a selection from or mix of the following policy options:

- non-involvement
- diplomatic persuasion, either bilateral or through regional groupings, and advice (including efforts to influence opposition groups or leaders where appropriate)
- special technical, economic, public information, civil security, police or military assistance to include operational assistance for internal defense programs and psychological operations
- assistance as a means of inducing policies designed to counter underlying causes of internal security problems
- boycott of a government through denial of normal diplomatic or economic relations
- use of military force to assist in restoring or maintaining internal order

It will always be necessary for responsible U.S. officials both in Washington and in the field to make judgments, in individual country situations, concerning the character of U.S. action and the degree of U.S. assistance which may be desirable (from the U.S. point of view or the country's own standpoint) or tolerable or effective or available. Judgments of the appropriateness of political, military, economic, and psychological activities must be applied on a continuing basis as the situation in a country changes or develops.

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Political development programs to provide for improved communication between the population at large and the central government can strengthen nations vulnerable to subversion and unrest. Encouragement of increasing popular involvement and wider participation in indigenous private and government institutions can induce people to seek desired social and economic opportunities and reforms through overt legal means rather than through subversion and violence. Such institutions as local development committees, regional councils, and rural production and marketing cooperatives may act as effective vehicles for participation in local and national development programs leading to the evolution of self-reliant societies resistant to subversion and insurgency. Legal development and public administration programs also may contribute to the achievement of this goal.

Effective police and public safety activities can play an important part in the prevention and handling of internal security problems. A capable and humane police force can be invaluable in coping with and controlling internal security situations at minimum cost with limited use of force and within the framework of civil law. It can be a factor in preventing dissension and dissatisfaction from growing outside the bounds of legitimate opposition and becoming subversion. In developing countries, U.S. police assistance programs can play an important role, not only in the preservation of public order, but in the building of indigenous civil security institutions which can keep pace with and assist in the nation's growth process. The effectiveness of public safety forces can be greatly enhanced if programs for their development are instituted in advance of potential crises. Such programs may be justified also to keep developing countries from obtaining police assistance from Communist or other countries hostile to the United States. Among the responsibilities which the indigenous security agencies can be brought to assume are the protection of broadening freedoms and the prevention of crime and terror which jeopardize the freedoms and interfere with national development. Public information programs can facilitate public acceptance of this role for the police.

The armed forces of a developing country can constitute the means for protection against internal insurrection beyond the

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capability of civilian police to control. The existence of loyal, appropriately trained, and effective military forces can represent an important deterrent against terrorism or guerrilla warfare and is an important element in internal defense planning. In addition, in many countries, the military establishment possesses equipment and skills representing a major national investment and resource. Frequently the United States can influence governments to use this resource in the nation building process without detracting from the capability of the military to perform its primary defense function.

Students, other youth groups, and labor are often prime target groups for local programs. The United States may be of assistance through these groups in promoting social progress in the developing society. Opportunities may also exist for influencing opposition leaders where Communist or other adverse influences seem likely to prove too disruptive.

Information activities, both person-to-person contact and mass media can play a significant part in the communication process by creating a favorable climate for change and self-help and providing facts and focus for political dialogue.

There may occasionally be opportunities for the resources of U.S. business firms and philanthropic foundations to be applied in support of U.S. objectives. Many private U.S. firms and foundations engage in programs to improve social and economic conditions in countries abroad and can usefully be encouraged to provide assistance and to adopt employment practices which will identify them with popular improvements and aspirations in support of U.S. goals.

Considerations affecting the level of U.S. assistance when provided, include the availability of U.S. and indigenous official and private resources, the financial and manpower impact of U.S. assistance on local governments, and opportunities to obtain assistance from third countries or international organizations.

The choice of U.S. programs and the determination of levels will also be influenced by the degree of identification with

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the local government we are willing to accept. In most cases, we will want to do everything possible to see that critical sectors of the local society understand the role that the United States is seeking to play. Psychological operations and information programs can assist in achieving this goal.

E. Implementation of the Policy

For the United States to act promptly and effectively when required by U.S. interests in connection with foreign internal defense problems, the responsible Departments and Agencies must be well informed about countries and regions where internal security problems exist or may arise. Intelligence and other information must be constantly available to allow policy makers and operators to anticipate contingencies. Planning, development, and coordination of programs and operations must take place in advance to ensure that necessary internal defense activities are provided for and will be supported from U.S. resources. The Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups, established by NSAM 341, March 2, 1966, are the mechanisms by which interdepartmental activities overseas are directed, coordinated, and supervised by the Secretary of State. Foreign internal defense activities explicitly fall within the scope of this NSAM. In the field, the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, assisted by representatives of other agencies, has responsibility for plans and programs concerning foreign internal defense.

III. COURSES OF ACTION

To support this policy, the United States should, through the SIG-IRG mechanism established by NSAM 341 of March 2, 1966,

- A. identify and establish priorities for countries in which an internal security situation represents a threat to significant U.S. interests and where U.S. internal defense assistance would be desirable and feasible; keep the list of such countries and their priorities under constant review;
- B. develop a comprehensive plan to provide U.S. internal defense assistance to each country identified under A. above; the plan may be a separate internal defense plan or part of a more comprehensive country plan; in either case it should

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1. be prepared, according to format, timing, and other guidelines established by the Senior Interdepartmental Group and the relevant Regional Interdepartmental Group,
 2. be, under normal circumstances, the responsibility of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in the country concerned,
 3. integrate internal defense with other U.S. foreign affairs programs and activities,
 4. take into account the capabilities of political advice, diplomatic persuasion, public information programs, public safety operations, civic action programs, other economic and military assistance, and psychological, counterinsurgency, countersubversive, unconventional warfare, and other appropriate operations to contribute to internal defense,
 5. focus on improving the capabilities of the country itself -- its leaders, its government, and its people -- to strengthen its own internal security, using U.S. programs and resources in supporting roles,
 6. discuss in detail the funds required for implementation and those available from existing resources, along with a recommendation as to sources of additional funds required, U.S. or local,
 7. be coordinated interdepartmentally,
 8. be subject to critical review, along with operations under it, and periodic updating.
- C. provide for, in the plans referred to in B. above maximum possible emphasis on the development by each country concerned of its own capability to anticipate, prevent, and defeat subversion or insurgency; when external assistance is necessary, the United States should urge other resource-abundant nations to provide help and

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should, insofar as feasible, work through international and multilateral institutions;

- D. prepare and coordinate interagency contingency studies for the possible use of U.S. military forces in situations where the U.S. national security interest is threatened by subversion, insurgency, or disorder in foreign countries;
- E. maintain and strengthen intelligence and other reporting procedures where necessary to enable responsible U.S. officials to anticipate and to follow closely foreign internal defense situations of interest to the United States;
- F. maintain and strengthen training programs where necessary to ensure that selected personnel may be able to carry out effectively all of the functions referred to above, both in the field and in Washington.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

June 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Executive Chairman, IRG/AF
IRG/ARA
IRG/EA
IRG/EUR
IRG/NEA
Chairman, Political-Military Group

FROM: *WJH* Under Secretary Katzenbach, Chairman
Senior Interdepartmental Group

SUBJECT: Implementation of U.S. Policy on Internal Defense
in Selected Foreign Countries

In implementation of the "U.S. Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries", approved by the SIG on May 23, 1968, the following responsibilities are assigned to you:

1. Each IRG will provide the SIG by July 1 with names of countries within its area of responsibility where the internal security situation represents a threat to significant United States interests and where United States foreign internal defense assistance would be desirable and feasible under the criteria of the revised policy. The list should be supported by a brief explicit statement of the reasons for including each country.

Strict application of the revised criteria necessarily will reduce the number of countries worldwide that qualify for United States assistance in the field of internal defense. However, it is recognized that in some countries current programs

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will have to be continued (although phased down over time) even if not completely justifiable on the grounds of an internal security threat to significant United States interests. Valid reasons for such exceptions may be preservation of a special political or military relationship, supplementing economic development assistance, repayment for United States overseas base rights, or protection of other United States interests. Each IRG will be expected to distinguish clearly between those countries which fully qualify for foreign internal defense assistance under the revised policy, and those which the IRG believes should continue to receive such assistance for other reasons, submitting to the SIG only the names of those countries in the former category.

2. Upon approval by the SIG of a country's inclusion and its priority in the foreign internal defense action list, a comprehensive analysis of the internal defense situation in that country will be prepared under the supervision of the Chief of Diplomatic Mission for review and approval by the IRG. This analysis will include a detailed summary of host country, United States, third country, and international agency programs proposed to meet the internal threat.

This may take the form of a separate plan or be included in an overall foreign affairs planning document for the country concerned. In either case, internal defense considerations should be carefully related to and integrated with other political, economic, military, psychological, and informational aspects of United States policies and programs, and should focus on improving the capability of the country itself to strengthen its own internal security, using United States programs and resources in supporting roles. The country

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internal defense plan will be the basis for departmental and interdepartmental decisions on United States policies and programs concerning internal defense. Except as a new crisis may require, the plan should be submitted early enough in the budget cycle so that Washington guidance may be available to the field for use in the development of agency program documents. An outline showing the desired scope and a possible format for the internal defense section of a country plan or for a separate country internal defense plan is attached.

To avoid duplication of effort, each IRG should make maximum use of reports already submitted in the preparation of internal defense plans. For example, the internal security section of the Country Analysis and Strategy Papers (CASPs) submitted by Latin American posts in almost every case, following IRG review, will satisfy the requirement established by this directive.

3. Countries should be nominated for addition to or removal from the foreign internal defense action list by each IRG as individual circumstances warrant. The proposal by the IRG to place a country on the list should contain an explicit statement of the reasons therefor and for the priority recommended. The proposal to remove a country should indicate what change in circumstances has occurred. Each country on the list, and countries which the IRG feels are potential candidates for the list, should be re-examined no less often than annually as a basis for evaluating on-going programs and determining whether the status of the country has changed. Additions to, or deletions from, the foreign internal defense action list must have SIG concurrence.

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4. The Political-Military Group, acting on behalf of the SIG, will be responsible for:
 - a. Recommending priorities among countries selected for United States action in the foreign internal defense field;
 - b. Exploring inter-regional and overall foreign policy implications of internal defense strategies and resource allocations recommended by the IRGs;
 - c. Reviewing interagency contingency studies involving the possible use of United States military forces in situations where the United States national security interest requires it;
 - d. Ensuring interdepartmental coordination of foreign internal defense research and development activities to make sure that United States resources are used most effectively to provide information, hardware, and techniques for application in the foreign internal defense field;
 - e. Reviewing, on the basis of the above, all internal defense country plans and related reporting; assisting the IRGs; bringing to the attention of the SIG additional options or alternative approaches in the light of overall United States resources, strategies, and commitments, and other matters requiring decision or consideration at that level; reporting at regular intervals to the SIG on foreign internal defense matters.
5. When carrying out its responsibilities under this directive, the Political-Military Group should

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include representatives from all Departments and Agencies holding membership in the SIG and IRGs.

Attachment:

Suggested Outline for a Foreign
Internal Defense Plan

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Attachment A

SUGGESTED OUTLINE FOR A
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE PLAN (FIDP)

Country

I. BASIC STRATEGY

Briefly summarize the significant United States interests requiring a United States concern with the internal security of the country. Indicate what group, or groups, pose a threat to internal security and to what extent, if any, these groups are, or may be, supported by or allied with a foreign government. Indicate also the adverse consequences for the United States of successful efforts to subvert the existing government. State why United States support is believed to be both necessary and useful for the successful suppression of threats to internal security, and indicate the general magnitude of United States resources likely to be required over the next five years.

II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

- A. Political
- B. Economic/Social
- C. Security
 - 1. External
 - 2. Internal

Briefly analyze recent developments and future prospects (three to five years) under categories A, B, and C, above, in terms of the country's major strengths and weaknesses; identify the actual and potential internal security threat and its causes, including:

- a. Nature of the threat.
- b. Sources of the threat.
- c. Probable lines along which the threat may develop.
- d. Target areas of the threat.

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Weigh the vulnerabilities of the society to the threat; assess the capability of the country to cope with the threat; and estimate the opportunities open to influence by the United States. Specific attention should be given to major sociological/religious/cultural factors peculiar to the host country that may influence its ability--even with United States and other assistance--to meet the internal threat. If required, additional background information should be included in appendices.

III. GENERAL AND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

A. Political

1. e.g., institutional development
2. e.g., representative processes

B. Economic/Social

1. e.g., economic growth and modernization
2. e.g., education, health, and community development

C. Security

1. e.g., police and public safety
2. e.g., military capability

List, in order of priority, the general United States objectives in the country over the next three to five years for each of the above categories as related to internal security programs. The list should include cultural/sociological/psychological objectives in each category. Specific internal defense objectives should be stated in terms of the goals the United States wishes the host country to pursue. These objectives, to the extent possible, should be quantified in terms of results desired within a stated time (e.g., levels of investment, extent of programs). In those countries which have initiated actions to achieve goals in accordance with a development plan, the United States specific objectives should be consistent as far as possible with those of the host government.

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IV. COURSES OF ACTION

- A. Political
- B. Economic/Social
- C. Security

The development and subsequent selection of programs to achieve objectives in each of the above categories should include consideration of actions of the host country, the United States, third countries, and international organizations. The proposed programs and projected resources necessary to execute them should be discussed briefly; detailed analysis, including a summary of resources available from the host country, the United States, third countries, and international agencies, should be dealt with in Section V.

V. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY

- A. Political programs
- B. Economic/Social programs
 - 1. Long-range (low immediate impact)
 - 2. Short-range (high immediate impact)
- C. Civic Action
 - 1. Police
 - 2. Military
 - 3. Paramilitary
- D. Security programs
 - 1. Police
 - 2. Military
 - 3. Paramilitary
 - 4. Others

This discussion should refer directly to the programs presented in Section IV, identifying estimated United States dollar cost of each program and proposed major projects. The analysis should show specifically what portion of the recommended assistance is included in existing United States programs, such

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as the Five-Year Military Assistance Program and the AID Programs, and should specify the dollar amount and recommended sources of any additional funding required. Discussion of security programs should include the requirements for equipment and materiel, in-country advisors, and formal and on-the-job training. These requirements should be tied closely to specific objectives described in Section III above.

VI. APPENDICES

Data and fact sheets should be appended as back-up material pertinent to the plan.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

June 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON TRAINING

FROM: Under Secretary Katzenbach,
Chairman, Senior Interdepartmental Group

SUBJECT: Review of National Interdepartmental Seminar and
Related Training Programs in the Field of Foreign
Internal Defense

On May 23, 1968 the SIG approved the United States Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries (FIDP), superseding the United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy (USOIDP) of 1962. Recognizing that the new policy statement would affect the curricula of the National Interdepartmental Seminar (NIS) and related government training programs in the field of foreign internal defense, the interagency Working Group which prepared the FIDP recommended that the necessary revision of programs be the responsibility of the Committee on Training. This recommendation was accepted by the SIG.

Therefore I request that the Committee on Training initiate a review of the structure, goals, methods, and curricula of the NIS and related training programs, and recommend steps to ensure that the guidelines of the FIDP will be assimilated in all government training in the field of foreign internal defense. I would like to have your report for SIG consideration by August 15.

In the course of this study, I hope that the Committee on Training will address itself to such questions as:

1. Which officers require the special training offered by the NIS?
2. Do students find the training applicable to problems they later face in the field?

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3. How can balanced attendance from all agencies, services, and departments best be achieved?
4. Would the NIS be more effective (and would attendance be approved) if, for example, the seminar were abbreviated from four weeks to two?

The Committee on Training should feel free to request assistance from any agency or department represented on the SIG, and to seek the counsel of those who drafted the FIDP. In addition, I suggest that the forthcoming Fifth Coordination Conference of Directors of Training, sponsored by the NIS, would provide an ideal forum to discuss the significance of the new emphasis in the FIDP, and to enlist the efforts of those attending the conference in your review.

I also hope that you will consult closely with the Chairmen of the IRGs, particularly ARA and EA, to obtain their views on training needs.

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TO : ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
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 FOR POLAD CINCSTRIKE; SCOTT AFB FOR POLAD COMAC; OKINAWA
 FOR POLAD HICOM RYUKYUS; HEIDELBERG FOR POLAD CINCUSAREUR;
 BRUSSELS FOR SHAPE (BRANDIN); WIESEADEN FOR POLAD CINCUSAFE;
 HONOLULU FOR POLAD CINCPAC.
 FROM : Department of State

DATE: JUN 13 9 19 AM '68

SUBJECT : United States Policy on Internal
 Defense in Selected Foreign Countries

REF :

Attached at TAB A is a copy of the new U.S. policy directive on foreign internal defense approved on May 23, 1968 by the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG). This directive supersedes the U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy (USOIDP) issued in 1962. The policy review was commissioned by the SIG and conducted by an interdepartmental group (State, AID, Defense, JCS, CIA, USIA) under State leadership. The directive is designed to incorporate six years of experience and changes of policy emphasis in a document available to all agencies. The main clarifications and new directions are:

A. It clarifies the U.S. role--the concept of the United States as the world's anti-communist gendarme is rejected and the need for limitation on United States commitment is recognized. United States activities in the field of internal defense should be limited to those few countries in which (1) we have a significant national interest; (2) there is clear evidence that internal disorder or subversion threatens that interest; (3) there is an indigenous will to resist as well as the desire

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
 not automatically declassified.

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Date:

Initials:

FORM 10-64 DS-323

Drafted by: G/PM: Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-06207A000100050010-1

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Mr. Katzenbach

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and capability to use effectively U.S. assistance; and (4) the resources and assistance needed to maintain internal security are not available from other sources.

B. It recognizes that the modernization process in developing countries is inherently disorderly and unsettling and that upheavals and violence must therefore be anticipated as part of the development pattern.

C. It stresses that assistance in the field of foreign internal defense cannot be considered in isolation from the whole range of political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological factors which comprise total United States involvement with a given country.

D. It reiterates the fundamental role of the IRGs and the SIG in the implementation of the new policy, and calls for compilation of a new listing of high priority countries which meet the revised criteria, and eventual drafting of up-to-date internal defense plans for those countries by our overseas missions to be approved by the IRGs.

The SIG has also issued a directive (TAB B) to the Executive Chairman of the IRGs and to the Chairman, Political-Military Group for implementation of the new policy. The role of the Political-Military Group is to monitor, on behalf of the SIG, U.S. policies and programs in the foreign internal defense field. In carrying out this responsibility the PMG will be principally concerned with recommending priorities among countries to be selected by the IRGs for U.S. action, exploring inter-regional and overall foreign policy implications of internal defense strategies and resource allocations recommended by the IRGs, and reviewing inter-agency contingency studies of the possible use of U.S. military forces.

Addressees in countries being considered for attention under the new policy will be notified by separate instruction. In some cases, planning documents or reports already submitted (e.g., CASPs on Latin American countries), will fulfill all or the major part of the requirement set forth in paragraph 2 of TAB B, concerning the preparation of country foreign internal defense plans.

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The policy directive will have the effect of narrowing the number of countries subject to the new procedures. Despite this fact, the directive is being sent to all posts, and officers should become familiar with its provisions as an important policy document.

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Attachments:

TAB A - U.S. Policy Directive on
Foreign Internal Defense

TAB B - Directive to Executive Chairmen of IRGs
and Chairman, Political-Military Group
for Implementation of new Policy

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MEMORANDUM

TO : Chairman, Committee on Training

FROM : Chairman, Working Group

SUBJECT : The Foreign Internal Defense Policy (FIDP), National Interdepartmental Seminar and Related Training

The Committee on Training was directed by SIG Memorandum of June 10 to review the structure, goals, methods, and curricula of the NIS and related training programs, and to recommend necessary steps to ensure that the guidance of the FIDP is assimilated into training. This memorandum is the Working Group's response to the Committee on Training in meeting this directive.

The FIDP integrates internal defense into the frame of total considerations that apply to foreign policy determination and application in the developing countries. By emphasizing selectivity in U.S. commitments and policy and management guidance rather than doctrine, it points up more directly than did the 1962 OIDP the need for senior officer competence to make judgments concerning the nature and speed of the process of political, economic, and social development, and, where U.S. interests require, finding ways to influence the process constructively.

Under the FIDP, there is greater emphasis on the responsibility of senior officers to make individual assessments and judgments that involve the consideration and weighing of diverse and complex factors, to include:

- political and sociological-cultural backgrounds and dynamics of country situations with all their ambiguities, contradictions, instabilities and unique elements;
- significance of turbulence and disorders as indicators of internal development or of exploitation by communist or other forces;
- implications of internal country developments for regional and international relationships;
- identification of the nature and degree of U.S. interests;
- opportunities and limitations of external assistance, with particular attention to strengthening internal security capability;
- capabilities and resources of U.S. agencies;

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- implications for U.S. position and policy of resource commitments in individual situations.

These are the principal elements around which this training for senior officers should center.

The identification of the nature and degree of significant U.S. interests and the opportunities and limitations for U.S. assistance to aid the process of national development, including internal security capability, in each unique country situation is now of particular importance. Senior officers must take a hard-headed and dispassionate view of the situation in each individual country concerning the character and implications of U.S. action. The development of greater analytical competence and sensitivity to all factors that must be considered and weighed in determining and understanding the nature and degree of U.S. interests should be a central purpose of training programs.

The FIDP and its requirement for Internal Defense Plans also underscores the need for an interagency approach in meeting U.S. responsibilities in these countries. The Ambassador and other senior officers in each country must be fully aware of the capabilities and resources of U.S. agencies which can be drawn upon to strengthen foreign internal defense capability, including assisting, training or supplementing the military and paramilitary forces of developing countries. The different agencies' programs must be coordinated and focused on U.S. objectives in the country.

The Working Group concludes that:

- (A) all training programs in the field of foreign internal defense should be forthwith reviewed and revised, as necessary, to ensure that proper emphasis be given to social, political, and cultural factors in developing countries; to political and institutional development; to the identification of the nature and degree of U.S. interests; and to the opportunities, limitations and consequences of U.S. assistance;
- (B) greater attention should be given in each agency to ensure that senior officers are scheduled to attend the NIS;
- (C) the NIS should continue and give even higher priority to its role as the focal point for interagency training on U.S. policy for foreign internal defense. It is noted that the June Coordination Conference for training directors from all agencies and services provided such a focal point for dissemination and discussion of the new guidance.

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The NIS is now engaged in developing a format and syllabus for a revised course that incorporates the guidance of the FIDP.

As additional steps, the Committee on Training should:

- (A) update training policies and objectives as set forth in NSAM 283;
- (B) promulgate the SIG-approved glossary of terms for use by all agencies. (Tab A)

The Working Group recommends that the Committee on Training approve and forward to the SIG the attached draft response. (Tab B)

Attachments:

Tab A - Glossary of Terms

Tab B - Draft Response to the SIG

Working Group: 7/18/68

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TAB A

GLOSSARY OF TERMS FOR THE FIDP

CLANDESTINE OPERATION - Activities to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE - Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or non-military agencies of a government against guerrillas.

COUNTERINSURGENCY - Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - That aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage.

COVERT OPERATIONS - Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operations.

EVASION AND ESCAPE (E&E) - The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.

GUERRILLA - A combat participant in guerrilla warfare.

GUERRILLA WARFARE (GW) - Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

INSURGENCY - A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist-inspired, supported or exploited.

INSURRECTION - A rising up against established authority; rebellion; revolt.

INTERNAL DEFENSE - The full range of measures taken by a government to protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

INTERNAL SECURITY - The state of law and order prevailing within a nation.

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION - The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. Forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)

PARAMILITARY FORCES - Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resemble them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

PARAMILITARY OPERATION - An operation undertaken by paramilitary forces.

PROPAGANDA - Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals in support of national objectives, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

BLACK - Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one.

GREY - Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source.

WHITE - Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS - These operations include psychological warfare, and, in addition, encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behaviour to support the achievement of national objectives.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE - The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviour of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

SUBVERSION - Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE - Includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion. Unconventional warfare operations are conducted within enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.

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TAB B

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chairman, SIG

FROM : Chairman, Committee on Training

SUBJECT : The Foreign Internal Defense Policy (FIDP), National Interdepartmental Seminar and Related Training

This memorandum responds to the SIG's directive of June 10 to review the NIS and related governmental programs to ensure that they assimilate in their training the guidance in the FIDP. Specific questions concerning the NIS are answered separately in the enclosure.

The FIDP integrates internal defense policy within the total framework of U.S. foreign policy determination and application in developing countries. While the 1962 ODP placed more emphasis on doctrine, the FIDP emphasizes selectivity in U.S. commitments and places greater responsibility on senior officers to make assessments and judgments involving the weighing of such diverse and complex factors as:

- political and sociological-cultural backgrounds and dynamics of country situations with all their ambiguities, contradictions, instabilities and unique elements;
- significance of turbulence and disorders as indicators of internal development or of exploitation by communist or other forces;
- implications of internal country developments for regional and international relationships;
- identification of the nature and degree of U.S. interests;
- opportunities and limitations of external assistance, with particular attention to strengthening internal security capability;
- capabilities and resources of U.S. agencies;
- implications for U.S. position and policy of resource commitments in individual situations.

The development of greater analytical competence and sensitivity to these and other factors that must be considered and weighed in determining

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and understanding the nature and degree of U.S. interests should be the central purpose of senior-officer training programs.

The Committee on Training recommends that:

- (A) all training programs in the field of foreign internal defense be forthwith reviewed and revised, as necessary, to ensure that proper emphasis be given to social, political, and cultural factors in developing countries; to political and institutional development; to the identification of the nature and degree of U.S. interests; and to the opportunities, limitations, and consequences of U.S. assistance;
- (B) greater attention be given in each agency to ensure that senior officers are scheduled to attend the NIS;
- (C) the NIS continue and give even higher priority to its role as the focal point for interagency training on U.S. policy for foreign internal defense. It is noted that the June Coordination Conference for training directors from all agencies and services provided such a focal point for dissemination and discussion of the new guidance.

As a first step, the Committee on Training has instructed the NIS to develop by October 1 an intensive course that will incorporate the guidance of the FIDP into its training. As additional steps, the Committee on Training will:

- (A) update training policies and objectives as set forth in NSAM 283;
- (B) promulgate the SIG-approved glossary of terms for use by all agencies.

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Enclosure - Page 1

1. Which officers require the special training offered by the NIS?

All senior officers (FSO/R-3, or Lt. Colonel/Commander and above) who will serve as members of the country team or as heads or deputies of a mission element in a developing country and in other countries as deemed desirable by each agency; in Washington and overseas headquarters, officers at the level of Country Director and officers holding responsible positions in policy and planning or the coordination of interagency programs for the developing countries; senior advisers from the civilian agencies assigned to service colleges and as political advisers to military commands.

2. Do students find the training applicable to problems they later face in the field?

A letter soliciting information in response to this question has been sent to 275 officers who have graduated from the Seminar over the past year. Replies will be evaluated by the NIS and the results reported to the Committee on Training.

3. How can balanced attendance from all agencies, services, and departments best be achieved?

As the Committee on Training has no directive authority, balanced attendance can only be achieved by the consistent and conscientious attention of participating agencies in assigning officers who require the training offered by the NIS. The problem lies in the assignment process within the individual agencies.

4. Would the NIS be more effective (and would attendance be improved) if, for example, the Seminar were abbreviated from four weeks to two?

It is the view of the Committee on Training that a two-week course could not be more effective in fulfilling the assigned training responsibilities of the NIS. In fact, it would be unproductive. An optimum time can be determined when the NIS completes development of a course outline embodying the guidance of the FIDP. The Committee on Training will review this outline to ensure that an intensive program is accomplished with the greatest possible economy of time.

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4. Would the NIS be more effective (and would attendance be improved) if, for example, the Seminar were abbreviated from four weeks to two?

This question really comprises two quite different questions, with the answer to one not being necessarily contingent on the answer to the other. The question of length, for example, can only be determined on the basis of the subject-matter to be covered and the amount of time to do it more productively. The question of attendance depends on the availability of personnel for whom the Seminar is intended.

Implicit throughout the ~~F~~IDP is the need for greater sensitivity to and understanding of the societies of the developing countries. The policy problem is to make judgments about the nature and speed of the process of national development and, where U.S. interests require, to find ways to influence that process constructively. This should be the main focus of the revised NIS. Other elements will of course be included. Still other elements will probably be given much less emphasis or be dropped.

The general concept of such a revised course is contained in the broad outline which is attached. This outline suggests merely some of the main guidelines, but hopefully that will be sufficient at present for purposes of review and discussion of the approach that is being proposed. It is anticipated that such a course would not only be more clearly attuned to the new ~~F~~IDP but also would more nearly fit the present requirements for a course for senior-level officers who either have been assigned or who can expect to be assigned to key positions in the developing countries.


With respect to methodology, such a course would require heavier emphasis on selective reading. In some specific cases, for example, the reading material would have to serve as an introduction to the subject-

matter that is to be discussed. In addition, there would most likely be less dependence on general lectures and greater dependence on seminar group discussion. This approach would entail greater intellectual involvement of the students.

At this stage, it would be difficult to state with any exactitude what the length of such a course should be. It is believed, however, that the topics outlined in the attachment could be covered in three weeks, if that should be necessary.

If attendance at the Seminar would be materially improved by cutting one week from the present course, it should be considered.

- I. Problems of Developing Countries
 - A. Developing countries in the world strategic equation
 - B. Social institutions
 - C. Value systems and cultural determinants of behavior
 - D. Political, economic development and social change
 - E. Developing modern institutions
 - F. Development and internal defense
- II. Vulnerabilities of the Developing Countries
 - A. Internal problems - sources and consequences of threat
 - B. External exploitation
 1. Soviet - Chicom - Others
 2. Intra-regional
- III. Identifying and evaluating U.S. interests and capabilities
 - A.
 - B.
 - C.
- IV. What trends and forces of change are likely to alter U.S. policy requirements?
 - A.
 - B.
 - C.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1964

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 283

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Attorney General
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of Central Intelligence ✓
 The Administrator, Agency for International Development
 The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Training Policy and Objectives

This supersedes NSAMs 131 and 163

I. GENERAL

The President has noted with approval the considerable progress made in the Government's internal defense/counterinsurgency training effort and would like to be assured that this effort is sustained in the future. He desires that personnel of each of the addressees with or to be assigned foreign affairs responsibilities (hereinafter foreign affairs officers) continue to receive comprehensive instruction on U.S. policy and strategies, and on the resources and techniques available to the United States in assisting underdeveloped countries cope with the problems of development and internal defense.

II. Training Policy and Objectives

A. U.S. Officer Personnel

The President has directed that all career-development training programs offered by each agency with major foreign affairs interests include study of the U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy. This instruction will be tailored in accordance with the specific overseas internal defense role and mission of the particular agency as well as to the career level of the officers receiving training.

B. U.S. Officers With Internal Defense/Counterinsurgency Responsibilities

In addition to this broad training for all foreign affairs officers, the President has approved specific training objectives for

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those officer-grade personnel indicated below who are scheduled for relevant assignment to the underdeveloped world or to headquarters or instructor positions related thereto.

1. For officers of the ranks GS-9 through 13 (FSO-8 through 4, 2 Lt (Ensign) through Lt. Colonel, Commander USN):

(a) Background

A comprehensive understanding of the history of insurgency movements, especially those in which the U.S. interest was involved. This will include instruction on the background and environmental factors--political, economic, social and psychological--of subversive insurgency, the means utilized to prevent, deter or defeat such movements, and the related problems of economic development.

(b) The Threat

A basic knowledge of communist ideology, organization, goals, and the strategy and techniques employed by communists in the underdeveloped world, including the doctrinal approaches of the Soviets and Red Chinese to political power. Particular emphasis will be placed on the various problems of development and communist methods of exploiting these problems.

(c) U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Programs

A basic knowledge of the U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy, its strategy of employment, U.S. internal defense (civilian and military) resources and programs, and the techniques and methods through which these programs are implemented.

(d) Departmental Tactics and Techniques

A thorough understanding of the tactics and techniques of the parent department, agency or military branch which have an application in detecting, combatting and defeating insurgency.

2. Officers of the ranks GS-14 (FSO-3, Colonel, Captain USN) and above will receive training in addition to instruction required by paragraphs A and B above, to prepare them for departmental, command, and staff responsibilities. At this level, special attention will be given to the unique resources and capabilities of all U.S. Government departments and agencies and of the need to combine these assets into effective programs.

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3.

(a) Situation Assessment and Evaluation

Develop an ability to identify the critical factors in internal security analyses of underdeveloped areas; how to recognize manifestations of dissidence and subversion.

(b) Program Planning

Detailed knowledge of the resources and capabilities of the parent department/agency or military branch which contribute to the overall USOID effort; the methodology of program development and internal defense planning to include inter-agency coordination of planning at the national level and abroad.

(c) Program Implementation

A thorough knowledge of the methods and techniques of implementing and executing programs of the parent department and related agencies; techniques of cooperation with the host government and third countries.

C. Officers Assigned "Key Positions"

All officers assigned to "key positions" (as determined by the Special Group (CI)) in the underdeveloped world or in headquarters positions related thereto, will receive special instruction at the National Interdepartmental Seminar. This training will be considered as a prerequisite for assignment to designated "key positions" although it will be available to other selected personnel on a case by case basis. Exception to this training as a prerequisite to such assignment may be made only by the head of the department or agency concerned.

While this training will include coverage of those items outlined in paragraph B above, emphasis will be given to the problems faced by the U.S. in assisting in the development and internal defense of the underdeveloped countries. Additional coverage will include:

1. The growing interdepartmental nature of U.S. foreign policy problems and programs.
2. The development and coordination of policy and program implementation.
3. The concept and operation of the Country Team.
4. The Washington organization for overseas internal defense.

D. Official Personnel of Foreign Governments

It is in the interest of the U.S. to provide training corresponding to the above to selected officials, both civilian and military of foreign governments. While emphasis should be placed on training officials from those countries actively threatened by an active subversive threat, our

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efforts should be aimed at influencing and gaining the support of USOID policies and programs from as many official personnel as possible throughout the underdeveloped world. To the extent practicable, this training should be given in the following places:

1. In facilities operated by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency which are available to foreign nationals.
2. In special facilities operated by the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and other available U.S. Government training centers operated for the benefit of foreign nationals.
3. U.S. MAAGs/Missions and USOMs in underdeveloped areas.
4. At private U.S. institutions, where feasible.

III. Action Responsibilities

A. Departmental

The Department of State will be responsible for developing and conducting such courses as may be necessary for officials of State, AID, and USIA and when appropriate for other civilian agencies with limited foreign operations. Each of the other addressee agencies will be responsible for the organization of appropriate training programs for its own officers. Each of the responsible departments and agencies will seek to coordinate its training programs and to the extent practicable and necessary, make available spaces for the cross-training of personnel from other U.S. agencies with development and internal defense responsibilities. While the Foreign Service Institute will be responsible for the administration and presentation of the National Interdepartmental Seminar, each of the addressee agencies will provide financial, faculty and student support to it.

B. National Interdepartmental Seminar

The National Interdepartmental Seminar will be the inter-agency training center for those officers assigned to "key positions". In performing this function, the Seminar will undertake research, develop case studies, and offer instruction on the manifold problems of development and internal defense and improve the U.S. capability to assist underdeveloped countries overcome these problems. In addition, the Seminar will serve as the focal point of the U.S. overseas internal defense training effort. Accordingly, it will undertake to assist other more specialized U.S. Government institutions engaged in related training activities by developing instructional materials on the non-technical aspects of internal defense and counterinsurgency.

C. Special Group (CI)

It shall be the responsibility of the Special Group (CI) to oversee and support this entire training effort, and to report to the President

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periodically upon the degree to which the training objectives outlined above are being achieved. The inter-agency Subcommittee on Training, established by the Special Group (CI), will assist the latter in overseeing and supporting this training effort.

Further, it is desired that the Special Group (CI) determine the adequacy of the effort we are making to train selected foreign official civilian and military personnel in the problems of development, internal defense and counterinsurgency and seek to insure the effective coordination of these programs. Where deficiencies are determined to exist, the Special Group (CI) will direct appropriate corrective action.

McGeorge Bundy

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